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OWNERSHIP RIGHTS DON’T STOP AT THE
SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: A CALL FOR PROTECTION OF
UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS’ RIGHTS TO
COPYRIGHTABLE WORK
Jaclyn Sayegh*
Intellectual property law is a fundamental doctrine founded in the
U.S. Constitution. One manifestation of that doctrine is the Copyright
Act, which seeks to promote creation and knowledge while protecting the
rights of intellectual property owners. The Act fails to sufficiently
promote these goals, however, by offering inadequate protection to the
copyright ownership rights of undergraduate students from
misappropriation by their universities. Undergraduate students create
copyrightable works at greater frequencies than they create either
patentable or trademarkable works, yet these students represent a class
that the law seems to have overlooked.
To justify the involuntary transfer of copyright ownership from the
student to the school, universities may rely on the Copyright Act’s workfor-hire doctrine or attempt to enforce their intellectual property policies
against the students as binding contracts.
This Note argues that universities lack the authority to usurp student
intellectual property rights under either of these justifications. It
provides that the work-for-hire doctrine is inapplicable because students
are not employees and explains how contract law’s doctrines of
consideration and unconscionability preclude the enforceability of such
policies. This Note describes the significance of protecting student works
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2016; B.S., Advertising and Marketing
Communications, Fashion Institute of Technology, 2012. I would like to thank
my father, Emile Sayegh, for serving as my scrupulous line editor and my
compass through law and life. Thank you to my mother and the rest of my
family and friends for tolerating and supporting me throughout even my most
stressful moments. Finally, I want to thank the executive board and staff of the
Journal of Law and Policy for their tireless work and efforts throughout the
editing process.

803

804

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

at the undergraduate level and calls for an amendment to the Copyright
Act to expressly prohibit universities from misappropriating the
copyright ownership rights of students at the undergraduate level.

INTRODUCTION
When undergraduate student Diana Rubio found out that
Barnes & Noble chose her backpack design drawing to represent
the Fashion Institute of Technology (“FIT”) in the retailer’s newest
collection, she likely did not predict that the very drawing would
one day land her in federal court, fighting both the bookseller and
her alma mater to regain what she believes is rightfully hers: the
intellectual property rights to her design.1 Diana’s professor had
told her that she and her Accessory Design classmates would earn
thirty percent of their course grade by submitting drawings to a
contest2 that Barnes & Noble sponsored in collaboration with FIT
as part of its “Back to Campus Design by Students for Students
collection.”3 What the instructor did not share with Diana,
however, was that Barnes and Noble would produce and sell her
“Everything Backpack” design in its stores around the world and
that the school—not Diana—would profit from the royalties.4 This
was especially surprising because Diana refused to sign “the rights
and consent” form that the Chairman of the FIT Accessories
Design Department presented to her, which would formally
transfer all of her ownership rights to the school.5 With little more
to show for her work than a miniscule credit on a sales tag,6 Diana
filed a lawsuit against Barnes & Noble and FIT for copyright
infringement and is asking the Southern District of New York to
1

Dareh Gregorian, Former Student Sues over Backpack She Designed for
FIT and Was Sold at Barnes & Noble, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 18, 2014, 9:29
PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/fit-design-left-profits-lawsuitarticle-1.1908121.
2
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at para. 9, Rubio v. Barnes &
Noble, Inc., No. 14-CV-06561 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014), 2014 WL 4063768.
3
Gregorian, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 2, paras. 19–20.
6
Id. paras. 24–26.
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either compel royalty payments from both parties or enjoin
indefinitely the production and sale of the “Everything
Backpack.”7
Undergraduate students, like Diana, will continue to suffer the
repercussions of university usurpation of their intellectual property
rights until Congress amends existing copyright law to protect
student-generated copyrightable works created within the scope of
the academic environment. The realms of copyright law reach far
and wide to protect the works of faculty and graduate students in
the university setting but stop short at the undergraduate level.8 In
a world where students may have more advanced skills than their
adult counterparts,9 and where some of the most successful
companies are spawns of undergraduate student creation,10 the
need for protection of intellectual property rights at this level is
paramount. Nevertheless, the existing law leaves a gaping hole
7

Id. para. I. In October 2014, the District Court granted defendants’ motion
to dismiss Rubio’s claims under the Copyright Act, reasoning that the backpack
design was not copyrightable due to its “intrinsic utilitarian function.” Anthony
V. Lupo & Anthony D. Peluso, Barnes & Noble Schools Former FIT Student in
IP Suit, as Federal Court Finds Backpack Design Not Copyrightable, FASHION
COUNSEL (Dec. 15, 2014), http://fashioncounsel.com/articles/barnes-nobleschools-former-fit-student-ip-suit-federal-court-finds-backpack-design-not.
8
See K.J. Nordheden & M.H. Hoeflich, Undergraduate Research &
Intellectual Property Rights, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 34, 35 (1997) (“While
much attention has been given to the rights of faculty and graduate students,
little, if any, thought has been given to the rights of undergraduate students.”).
9
TYANNA K. HERRINGTON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON CAMPUS:
STUDENTS’ RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2010).
10
See, e.g., Nicholas Carlson, At Last – The Full Story of How Facebook
Was Founded, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2010, 4:10 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-facebook-was-founded-2010-3#we-cantalk-about-that-after-i-get-all-the-basic-functionality-up-tomorrow-night-1
(discussing how Mark Zuckerberg created Facebook while an undergraduate at
Harvard University); Jonathan Byrnes, How Microsoft Became MICROSOFT,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2010, 1:40 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
how-did-microsoft-become-microsoft-2010-9 (describing how Bill Gates
created Microsoft as an undergraduate student at Harvard University); Dean
Foust, Online Extra: Fred Smith on the Birth of FedEx, BLOOMBURG BUSINESS
(Sept. 19, 2004), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2004-09-19/onlineextra-fred-smith-on-the-birth-of-fedex (explaining how Fred Smith developed
the idea for FedEx while an undergraduate at Yale).
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through which the bundle of rights that lawfully belong to the
student falls directly into the hands of the university.11 Whether
this imbalance is due to a false general assumption that
undergraduate students do not create copyrightable work,12 or to
university intellectual property policies that lack both legal and
equitable force,13 the need for a solution remains the same.
Legislators should protect student works in order to preserve
the very purpose and foundation of intellectual property law, which
seeks to encourage rather than hinder creation.14 By failing to
recognize students’ rights and thus allowing universities to reap the
benefits of student work to the exclusion and detriment of the
students, the law has the effect of “limit[ing] the generation and
dissemination of knowledge, and inhibit[ing] creativity and
inventive activity.”15 Congress should legislate to prevent
intellectual property law from contradicting its own objectives; the
legislative action should protect undergraduate student works and
prevent universities from claiming ownership of such work
through inappropriate application of copyright and contract law.
This Note calls for legislative action to protect undergraduate
students’ intellectual property rights from misappropriation by
their universities. It examines existing legal doctrines that
universities may use to defend their claims of rights to studentgenerated works. It explains that universities lack authorization for
such ownership claims under both statutory and common law. This
Note argues instead that students are the sole owners of intellectual
property rights to the intellectual products they create within the
scope of their role as students. Any transfer of ownership should be
at the election of the students with proper consideration, rather
than at the will of the universities at which they study.

11

Carmenelisa Perez-Kudzma, Fiduciary Duties in Academia: An Uphill
Battle, 48 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 491, 519 (2008).
12
Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 35.
13
See Sandip H. Patel, Graduate Students’ Ownership and Attribution
Rights in Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.J. 481, 482 (1996).
14
See id. at 507 (“The current system of ownership rights in studentgenerated inventions is inconsistent with the underlying theme of promoting the
progress of science and useful arts.”).
15
Id.
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Part I will provide a brief overview of copyright law and will
explain why undergraduate students produce works that warrant
protection of copyright more so than any other doctrine of
intellectual property law. Part II will explain how students may be
deemed employees of the university under the Copyright Act or
under common law, as explained in the context of unpaid
internships, and will demonstrate how neither statutory nor
common law justifies the general transfer of rights from the student
to the school. Part III begins with an evaluation of university
intellectual property policies and describes how universities might
attempt to enforce these intellectual property agreements as
binding contracts to support their claim of ownership rights to
student work. Section III.A will introduce consideration, a
fundamental requirement of contract law, and explain how
university policies are unenforceable for lack of valid
consideration. Section III.B will provide an overview of contract
law’s doctrine of unconscionability and explain how this doctrine
prevents the enforcement of unfair intellectual property policies.
Section III.C will contend that university intellectual property
policies run against public policy. Part IV will discuss why
arguments that oppose allowing students to maintain ownership
rights are unfounded. Finally, Part V will suggest the
implementation of federal legislation to protect students’ rights in
order to remain consistent with the foundations and purpose of
intellectual property law.
I. OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW
The intellectual property clause of the U.S. Constitution states
that “The Congress shall have Power . . . To Promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries . . . .”16 The fundamental goal of
copyright law is to promote creation and expand knowledge.17
Further, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the primary

16
17

U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8.
See Patel, supra note 13, at 507; HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 13.
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purpose of copyright law is for the benefit of the public.18 Unlike
other forms of intellectual property, copyright protection attaches
to the protectable work at the time of its creation and grants a
number of exclusive rights in “original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression.”19 These exclusive rights
include the right to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute,
and publicly perform and display the copyrighted work.20
Critical to the understanding and application of copyright law
is the definition of “author.” Section 201(a) of the Copyright Act
provides that copyright ownership “vests initially in the author or
authors of the work[,]”21 but fails to define the term “author.”22
The Supreme Court has defined “author” as “he to whom anything
owes its origin . . . .”23 As a general rule, the Court explains that an
author is “the party who actually creates the work, that is, the
person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression
entitled to copyright protection.”24
Along with authorship, a second major prerequisite for
copyright protection is originality.25 An author may claim
ownership over a wide variety of subject matter, including literary
18

See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct.
Cl. 1973) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7) (“[C]opyright
was ‘not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of
the public.’”), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (explaining that the
primary purpose of copyright is “to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of special reward, and to allow the public access to
their genius . . . .”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (acknowledging
the primary benefit is to the public by holding “encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors . . . .”).
19
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2014).
20
Id. § 106.
21
Id. § 201(a).
22
See id. (The statute does not expressly provide a definition for the term
“author.”).
23
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
24
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737
(1989). However, the law provides a crucial exception to this general rule with
the work-for-hire doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). See infra Part II.A (this crucial
exception).
25
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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works, choreographies, pictorial and graphic works, photographs,
sound recordings, and architectural works,26 yet need only
contribute a minimal amount of creativity to the work in order to
fulfill the originality requirement of Section 102(a).27 Where this
requirement is met, protection continues for the duration of the life
of the author plus an additional seventy years.28
To put these rules into context, Diana Rubio would generally
be deemed the author of the drawing design for the “Everything
Backpack” since she created the idea for the original design and
translated the idea onto paper29—a fixed, tangible expression. The
design is original since it is a product of Diana’s own creation and
not simply a depiction of a backpack already in existence. Further
determination of the copyrightability of Diana Rubio’s drawing
design is beyond the scope of this Note.30 It will suffice to say that
26

Id. Ideas, on the other hand, are categorically excluded from protection
along with procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts,
principles, or discoveries. Id. § 102(b). See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1879) (holding that an author of a book that communicates a system or method
does not get the exclusive right to use of such knowledge but rather may only
protect the way she expresses that knowledge through her language and
organization of the book.).
27
17 U.S.C. §102(a); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 358 (holding that the originality requirement “is not particularly
stringent” and that “[o]riginality requires only . . . some minimal level of
creativity.”). In his widely cited treatise on copyright law, Melville Nimmer
explains the necessary quantum of originality to support a copyright: “[a]ny
‘distinguishable variation’ of a prior work will constitute sufficient originality to
support a copyright if such variation is the product of the author’s independent
efforts, and is more than merely trivial.” Melville B. Nimmer & David
Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[B] (2004). He continues, “a work is
original and may command copyright protection even if it is completely
identical with a prior work, provided it was not copied from such prior work but
is rather a product of the independent efforts of its author.” Id § 2.01[A].
28
17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
29
See generally Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 2
(describing “the Drawing” as Exhibit A).
30
Defendants Barnes & Noble and FIT filed a motion to dismiss Diana
Rubio’s unauthorized derivative work copyright claim on grounds that the
Everything Backpack “has an intrinsic utilitarian function, the design of which is
not copyrightable” while citing to Section 101 of the Copyright Act, which
excludes from protection any “useful article,” which is “an article having an
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
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outside the university context of this particular case, Diana would
be considered the author of the work and thus entitled to the full
bundle of exclusive rights explained above, including the right to
create derivative works,31 insofar as the work is deemed
copyrightable.32
Unlike copyright law, the other areas of intellectual property
law involve demanding requirements that make it difficult for
undergraduate students to create works that qualify for such
protection.33 The immediacy with which copyright protection is
granted34 and the ease with which students may satisfy the
authorship and originality requirements make it quite easy for
students to create copyrightable work.35 For these reasons, “more
than any other kind of legal protection, students will encounter

article or to convey information.” Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support
of Their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 6, Rubio v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.,
No. 14-CV-06561 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014), 2014 WL 5449179 (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2010)). Diana Rubio responded by arguing that the defendants’ argument
was misguided since an original work need not be copyrightable in order for a
derivative work to constitute unauthorized infringement under the Copyright
Act. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint at 12–13, Rubio v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., No. 14-CV06561 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014). Rubio’s argument seems to be on strong
ground as courts have repeatedly upheld contentions like hers. See, e.g., Lone
Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir.
1984) (“Further, we have held in a copyright infringement action that it makes
no difference that the derivation may not satisfy certain requirements for
statutory copyright registration itself.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
31
For a discussion of student creation of derivate works, see HERRINGTON,
supra note 9, at 30.
32
Note that under the work-for-hire doctrine of Section 201 of the
Copyright Act, FIT—not Diana—would be the author of the work. The
university may attempt to defend Diana’s infringement claim by claiming she
was an “employee” for sake of the doctrine, but this Note will explain the
weaknesses of such an argument in Part II.A.
33
See Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 37.
34
See supra note 19 and accompanying text (providing that copyright
protection attaches from the moment of creation).
35
See Patel, supra note 13, at 492.
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circumstances in which their intellectual products . . . are affected
by copyright.”36
Patent and trademark law, on the other hand, are far less
relevant at the undergraduate level.37 Patent law grants protection
only to “useful”38 inventions that are “novel.”39 This means that in
order to apply for a patent, the student would have to create an
entirely new invention that is not known or in use by any others in
the United States.40 Further, patent rights attach to a work only
after the creator successfully completes the expensive and
complicated application process with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.41 The high threshold of innovation and the
complex application process often present too large a hurdle for
undergraduate students to overcome.42
Trademark law does not include stringent novelty and
application requirements like patent law,43 but instead involves
other difficulties that prevent this area of law from frequently
applying to student-generated intellectual products. The federal
trademark statute—the Lanham Act—grants trademark protection
to “any word, name, symbol, or device . . .used . . . in
commerce . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of
the goods.”44 The purpose of trademark law is to protect the
goodwill of the mark owner and prevent consumer confusion as to

36

HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 30.
See id. at 37.
38
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).
39
Id. § 102(a).
40
Patel, supra note 13, at 489.
41
HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 23.
42
See id. (“It would be the rare student who is able to patent an intellectual
product without a partnership with a wealthy entity or individual.”).
43
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2014). The statute defines “trademark”
as “any word, name, symbol, or device” that is used in the market to identify the
source. Id. Under this definition, the mark need not be new to warrant
protection; for example, the word “apple” was already in existence at the time
when Steve Jobs attached it to his computers. Further, the Act protects
unregistered marks from unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) and thus
registration is helpful, but not necessary as it is with patent law.
44
Id. § 1127.
37
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product source.45 To receive protection, a mark must “be a unique
and distinctive identifier” of the source.46 As such, the scope of
protection is based on consumers and the likelihood of confusion
that may result in the marketplace from unauthorized use of a
mark.47 Though students are capable of creating trademarkable
works,48 the law applies less often to undergraduate students since
they do not usually participate in commerce as manufacturers,
sellers, or brand owners.
The elements required for copyright protection are both
realistic for and attainable by undergraduate students. Copyright
law does not present the hurdles of novelty49 and commerciality50
as do patent and trademark law. Undergraduate students like Diana
Rubio may become authors of original, protectable works with
minimal effort and in the normal course of their academic careers.
Despite the fact that copyright law applies to student work more
frequently and easily than any other doctrine of intellectual
property law, the Copyright Act still fails to provide adequate legal
protection
for
student
copyrightable
works
against
misappropriation by schools.51
II. NEITHER STATUTORY NOR COMMON LAW AUTHORIZES
UNIVERSITIES TO USURP STUDENTS’ INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
This section will introduce doctrines of both statutory and
common law that a university might use to categorize students as
employees and thus invoke the work-for-hire doctrine to support
their claim of ownership rights. First, it will examine the Copyright
Act’s work-for-hire doctrine and provide an example of the proper
45

Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach
To Trademark Law, 84 I OWA L. R EV . 611, 630 (1999).
46
See HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 20 (“The value in trademark is tied to
the reputation and goodwill of what or whom it represents, and for the trademark
to characterize its subject, it must be a unique and distinctive identifier.”).
47
See Dinwoodie, supra note 45, at 630.
48
HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 20.
49
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2014).
50
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2014).
51
Perez-Kudzma, supra note 11, at 494.
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context in which it may support university ownership. It will then
distinguish that case from the majority of student-university
relationships, including that of Diana Rubio and argue that, as a
general rule, the work-for-hire doctrine does not support the
transfer of ownership rights from the student to the school. Second,
it will further demonstrate how the work-for-hire doctrine is
inapplicable in the current context by examining the Department of
Labor’s criteria for when a student may not qualify as an employee
in the related context of unpaid internships. It will conclude that
students are generally not employees insofar as they proceed in
their roles as students and that the work-for-hire doctrine is
therefore inapplicable in the present context.
A.

The Work-for-Hire Doctrine Does Not Apply—
Students Are Not Employees

One of the main mechanisms by which schools may claim
ownership of intellectual property rights to student-generated work
is the work-for-hire doctrine of the Copyright Act.52 The doctrine
allocates ownership rights to employers, rather than the employees,
even in circumstances in which the employee generates the work.53
Section 201(b) provides:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author for purposes of this title, and,
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise
in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of
the rights comprised in the copyright.54
The language of the provision provides a mechanism through
which a university may claim ownership of student work by
deeming itself the “author” for copyright purposes even though the

52

See, e.g., Fleurimond v. N.Y. Univ., 876 F. Supp. 2d 190, 191 (E.D.N.Y.

2012).
53

Carmen J. McCutcheon, Fairplay or Greed: Mandating University
Responsibility Toward Student Inventors, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., Oct. 2003, at 3
(“Graduate students are often classified as staff by the university because of
their teaching roles.”).
54
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).
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student actually produces the work.55 The work-for-hire doctrine
will apply when two requirements are met: (1) the originator of the
work is deemed an “employee” of the institution or university; and
(2) the work was created within the regular “scope of
employment.”56
In defining whether an individual qualifies as an “employee” in
the work-for-hire context, the Supreme Court looked at Section
220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.57 The Court provided a list of
factors to consider in the analysis, which included the manner and
means of control over the work, the location of the work, the
degree of skill required, the source of the resources, the method of
payment, the extent of employee benefits, and the tax treatment of
the hired party.58 The Second Circuit examined these factors and
expanded the analysis further in Aymes v. Bonnelli, concluding that
while no single factor is determinative, the factors regarding
employee benefits and tax treatment were the most influential in
determining whether “employee” status was appropriate.59 It is
important to note that the highly dispositive factors—benefit plans
and payroll taxes—are just two of the “employee” status signals
that are missing from most student-university relationships.
A recent university-related intellectual property dispute
provides an example of the very specific circumstances under
which a university may properly invoke the work-for-hire
doctrine—and thus categorize the student as an employee—in
order to claim ownership rights over work that the student creates.
In Fleurimond v. New York University, the Eastern District of New
York held that a New York University (“NYU”) student, Ariel
Fleurimond, whom the school hired as a graphic designer through
the Federal Work Study program,60 was an “employee” of the
55

HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 37.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
57
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989).
58
Id. at 751.
59
Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
60
The Program provides funds for part-time employment to help needy
students to finance the costs of postsecondary education. Federal Work-Study
(FWS) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/
fws/index.html (last modified Apr. 17, 2014).
56
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school and that NYU was therefore the “author” and legal owner
of the full bundle of intellectual property rights that accompanied
Fleurimond’s protectable work.61
The NYU Athletics Department hired Fleurimond as an
equipment room aide but her employment changed after the NYU
Retails and Sales Department approached her to complete graphic
design work for the Athletic Department.62 In her move from the
towel room to the design lab, the terms and scope of Fleurimond’s
employment changed; she earned a higher salary and was asked to
complete an entirely different set of tasks.63 The subject matter that
spawned litigation was a cat character named “Orion,” which
Fleurimond created and designed as part of an assigned project as a
graphic designer.64 NYU was very pleased with Fleurimond’s
work and began using Orion on athletic team uniforms, apparel,
promotional items, and the NYU website.65 Fleurimond then
brought suit against NYU for copyright infringement after the
school refused to pay her royalties for use of the Orion mascot.66
In this case, the District Court correctly determined that NYU
was the proper “author” of Orion because Fleurimond met the
threshold requirements to satisfy the “employee” status under the
work-for-hire doctrine.67 The court based its determination on the
fact that Fleurimond received hourly monetary compensation and
was hired for the specific purpose of creating design materials.68
Further, the court reasoned that the relationship between
Fleurimond, in her capacity as a graphic designer, and NYU, was
61

Fleurimond enrolled in New York University’s baccalaureate studies
program in 2005 and then entered into the Federal Work Study Program in 2007.
Fleurimond v. New York Univ, 876 F. Supp. 2d 190 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). The
school hired Fleurimond as an athletic equipment room assistant in January of
that year and then as a graphic designer in March. Id. at 191.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 192. The graphic design position increased Fleurimond’s salary
from $8.00 per hour to $16.00 per hour “in recognition of the different nature
and scope of her employment.” Id.
64
Id. at 191.
65
Id. at 195.
66
Id. at 196.
67
Id. at 200 (“[T]here is no dispute that the Plaintiff was employed as a
graphic designer . . . .”).
68
Id. at 199.
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for the primary benefit of the school;69 and that the school
maintained substantial control over the work product she created
within the scope of her employment.70 Though these factors were
highly dispositive in the context of Fleurimond v. NYU, they are
absent from the majority of student-university relationships.71 The
holding therefore is limited to the very specific facts of the case,
where the student creates protectable work after having been hired
for the very task of creating such work; it cannot extend beyond
these facts into the majority of situations involving student
protectable works.72
The Fleurimond analysis is helpful in illustrating the stark
contrasts between students and employees in the educational
setting. Thus, Fleurimond supports the proposition that the workfor-hire doctrine does not provide an adequate justification upon
which the university may claim ownership of student intellectual
property rights in most circumstances. The Fleurimond decision
instructs that the relevant factors to consider in distinguishing
students from employees include compensation, primary benefit,
and substantial control over the work produced.73 Students are not
compensated for attending school.74 Nor is the goal of student
69

Id. at 210.
Id. at 202. The court conducted a thorough analysis as to whether the
work was, in fact, completed within the scope of her employment and concluded
in the affirmative. Id.
71
Kathleen M. Capano et al., Comment, In re Cronyn: Can Student Theses
Bar Patent Applications?, 18 J.C. & U.L. 105, 115 (1991) (“For most
educational purposes . . . the student simply will be a student; the autonomy of
the university will be preserved.”).
72
See Patel, supra note 13, at 502 (“Courts generally hold that when the
student creates material entitled to protection under federal intellectual property
laws while engaged in educational or training activities . . . the student is not
afforded the status of employee.”) (internal citations and quotation marks
removed); see also Capano, supra note 71, at 115 (“Even when a court classifies
a student as an employee, this classification may be limited in scope.”).
73
See generally Fleurimond v. N.Y. Univ., 876 F. Supp. 2d 190, 199–209
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (using such factors as the student’s monetary compensation,
specific purpose in being hired to create a new mascot for the primary benefit of
the school, and the university’s substantial control over the work to determine
that the student was an “employee” for purposes of the work-for-hire doctrine).
74
HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 38; see also Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra
note 8, at 37; LisaMarie A. Collins, Copyrightable Works in the Undergraduate
70
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participation in the undergraduate setting for the primary benefit of
the university; it is rather for the enhancement of the student’s
learning.75 Despite the fact that the university may maintain
significant control over the methods and means by which students
earn grades,76 such control does not itself give rise to employee
status of the students.77 The frequency with which these factors
apply to almost all student-university relationships leads to the
conclusion that, by and large, “the student simply will be the
student”78 and students will not qualify as “employees” insofar as
they continue to act primarily in their capacity as students.79
B.

Students are Not Employees under Common Law’s
Interpretation of Unpaid Internships

Student participation in unpaid internships can provide a
separate, yet related context that further demonstrates that students
are not employees in the eyes of the law. Throughout the last three
decades, the rate at which college students participate in
internships in the United States has consistently been on the rise.80
Student Context: An Examination of the Issues, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
285, 296 (2013).
75
HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 38.
76
Such substantial control is executed through the enforcement of course
requirements and individual class rules, grading criteria, the enforcement of
assignment deadlines, graduation requirements, curriculum requirements, etc.
77
In Fleurimond, NYU’s substantial control, evidenced by its instructions
for Fleurimond to revise her drawings several times at the Athletic Department’s
request, was not conclusive in the court’s determination that Fleurimond was an
employee. Fleurimond, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 201. The court instead included other
factors in its analysis, such as compensation and the benefit of the relationship.
Id.
78
Capano, supra note 71, at 115.
79
HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 38.
80
Jessica L. Curiale, Note, America’s New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid
Internships, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Urgent Need for Change, 61
HASTING L.J. 1531, 1535 (2010). See also Kevin Carey, Giving Credit, but Is It
Due?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/
education/edlife/internships-for-credit-merited-or-not.html (noting that interning
has “become the norm” and that a National Association of Colleges and
Employers survey of the graduating class of 2012 determined that a majority of
students graduated with an internship).
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Between the years of 1981 and 1991, the number of college
graduates with internships jumped from one in thirty-six to one in
three; in 2004, eighty percent of college seniors had an internship
and the number climbed to eighty-three percent by 2008.81 The
goal of an unpaid internship is to offer students critical
introductory experience in their profession of choice, to boost their
resume credentials, and to allow them to make valuable
connections with professionals.82 Most internships do not offer
monetary compensation83 but rather academic credit in lieu of
payment.84 The “unpaid” status of most internships has sparked
major controversy in recent years, where courts are penalizing
employers who fail to pay interns who fit the legal description of
“employees” under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).85
An article in the Notre Dame Journal of Legal Ethics and
Public Policy discusses the issues that arise in the context of
unpaid internships. Author David Gregory describes such
internships as “inherently exploitative”; they benefit employers by
providing a free workforce of individuals whose youth and
inexperience make them vulnerable to completing “grunt work”
and allowing the employer to gain “fresh perspectives and a means

81

Curiale, supra note 80, at 1535.
Id. (“[I]nternships allow students to gain insight into different companies
and perhaps make better career choices as a result.”); David L. Gregory, The
Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 227, 240 (1998) (explaining how student interns accept
unpaid internships “in the hope of bolstering skills and credentialed experience
sufficiently eventually to obtain, full-time compensated employment”); Sarah
Braun, The Obama “Crackdown:” Another Failed Attempt to Regulate the
Exploitation of Unpaid Internships, 41 SW. L. REV. 281, 299 (2012) (“When
students participate in well-developed internship programs, they have the
opportunity to develop important professional skills such as confidence, poise,
adaptability, and the ability to work collaboratively, all of which provide crucial
knowledge that is not necessarily taught in classroom environments.”).
83
Curiale, supra note 80, at 1533.
84
Gregory, supra note 82, at 241.
85
See Susan Adams, Employers Should Pay Their Interns. Here’s Why,
FORBES (June 9, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2014/06/09/
employers-should-pay-their-interns-heres-why/ (explaining that 35 suits have
been filed against employers by unpaid interns).
82
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to screen potential employees.”86 The FLSA requires payment of
minimum wage and overtime to all individuals who qualify as
“employees” under the statute.87
The Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department
of Labor provides six specific criteria that employers must meet in
order to avoid the “employee” status of interns and thus legally
withhold monetary payment: (1) the internship must provide
training similar to what would be given in an educational
environment; (2) the experience must primarily benefit the intern;
(3) the intern must not displace regular employees; (4) the
employer must not directly benefit from the intern’s participation
in the program; (5) the intern must not be entitled to formal
employment at the termination of the internship; and (6) the intern
must not expect monetary compensation.88 This set of criteria
seeks to ensure that the environment of the unpaid internship is as
close to the classroom setting as possible. It logically follows that
the law itself would not view students as employees where they
receive educational instruction for their own benefit and do not
expect payment, as is the case in most classroom settings.
Therefore, a student like Diana Rubio would not be considered
an employee of her school where she (1) created work in the
traditional educational environment of the classroom, (2) for the
purpose of receiving an education and earning a degree, (3) did not
displace any employees,89 (4) did not directly benefit her university

86

Gregory, supra note 82, at 241; see also 2010 Internship Salary Report,
INTERN BRIDGE 8 (2010), available at http://utsa.edu/careercenter/pdfs/
2010%20salary%20report.pdf (“The main purpose for-profit companies have
historically hosted internship programs is to gain access to highly qualified
talent at low cost . . . . [Thus,] the main assumption is that for-profit companies
have a profit motive in the hiring of interns.”).
87
29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (2014).
88
U.S. D EP’ T OF L ABOR , F ACT S HEET #71: I NTERNSHIP P ROGRAMS
U NDER
T HE
F AIR
L ABOR
S TANDARDS
A CT ,
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.htm (last updated Apr.
2010).
89
It is difficult to even consider a category of employment that would
logically follow if such an expectation were reasonable: would students expect
to be hired as students? That is not a typical occupation for purposes of
receiving compensation. Any other type of employment usually associated with
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by participating in the assignment, (5) was not entitled to
employment at the end of the term, and (6) did not expect payment
from such work as it was used in the academic setting.90 Rubio
created the design at the instruction of her professor and within the
scope of the course curriculum. The circumstances during which
Diana Rubio created her design represent the usual setting for
creation at the university level: a student completing course work
in a traditional, academic setting. Thus, the conclusion that Rubio
was not an employee at the time she created the work would apply
to the majority of student-university contexts, thus supporting the
notion that, in general, students are not legal employees of the
schools they attend as they proceed in their roles as students.91 An
exception would exist, however, where other circumstances are at
play; where the student is employed through the Federal Work
Study Program. In the Fleurimond case, Arielle Fleurimond was
employed through Federal Work Study.92

universities would likely require additional education, such as a teacher, school
psychologist, principal, etc.
90
One might argue that Diana Rubio did expect compensation as evidenced
by her suit seeking royalty payments for use of her “Everything Backpack”
design. This argument is misguided, however, because the use in this case was
commercial, which is not typical in the undergraduate setting. Had FIT
displayed Diana Rubio’s drawing in a school exhibit or used it as an example for
future students, it is not likely that Ms. Rubio would expect payment. However,
since the drawing was used for profit, an expectation of compensation is
reasonable. No matter how a court would determine this issue, the facts of the
Rubio case do not apply to standard undergraduate settings that do not involve
third-party commercialization of student work. Where no such circumstances
exist, students do not typically expect compensation for the work they create as
part of their course curricula and fit the other criteria set out by the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor to prohibit their determination as
“employees.”
91
An exception would exist where other circumstances are at play; for
example, where the student is employed through the Federal Work Study
Program. In the Fleurimond case, Arielle Fleurimond was employed through
Federal Work Study. See Fleurimond v. N.Y. Univ., 876 F. Supp. 2d 190
(E.D.N.Y. 2012).
92
See Fleurimond, 876 F. Supp. 2d 190.
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III. SCHOOL POLICIES ARE UNENFORCEABLE AS CONTRACTS
University intellectual property policies are unenforceable as
binding contracts. Universities may turn to their existing
intellectual property policies to suggest a contractual agreement
between the student and the school as the bases for their right to
claim ownership of students’ work.93 In understanding this
argument, it is important to first understand the context and content
of university intellectual property policies. The World Intellectual
Property Organization (“WIPO”)94 published a set of guidelines
geared specifically toward universities, which instructs them on
how to formulate intellectual property policies.95 The guidelines
encourage policy creators to explicitly address issues such as the
basic goals and objectives of the policy,96 coverage of persons and
works, ownership and disclosures, and income distribution.97
WIPO’s goal in providing the guidelines was to “safeguard”
university interests regarding “particularly sensitive” issues,
including those where a relationship between the school and a third
party results in the commercialization of student-created work.98
93

Collins, supra note 74, at 295.
WIPO is a specialized agency of the United Nations whose goal is to
“lead the development of a balanced and effective international intellectual
property (IP) system that enables innovation and creativity for the benefit of
all.” Inside WIPO, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/index.html. WIPO was created in 1967 and
currently has 188 member states. Id.
95
See World Intell. Prop. Org., Guidelines on Developing Intellectual
Property Policy for Universities and R&D Organization (advance copy)
[hereinafter WIPO Guidelines], available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/uipc/en/guidelines/pdf/ip_policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
96
Id. at 4 (“The basic goal of an intellectual property policy should
therefore be: to provide for the intellectual property generated at the institution;
to promote the progress of science and technology; to ensure that discoveries,
inventions and creations generated by staff and students are utilized in ways
most likely to benefit the public.”).
97
Id. at 5.
98
Id. at ii. The preface of the guidelines provides that most universities are
“amateur” in their approach to sponsorship and commercialized activities for
lack of any intellectual property policy at all. Id. Although WIPO is correct to
state that failing to have a policy is inadequate, this Note argues that those few
existing university intellectual property policies are also “amateur” in how they
94
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In accordance with the WIPO guidelines, most school policies
address this situation in how they define different elements of the
policy. These definitions address the specific subject matter that
triggers application of the intellectual property policy; how the
policy applies differently to faculty, staff, and students; how
ownership rights will be distributed; and the manner in which the
school will allocate income in the event that a student produces
commercial work.99 One author who has focused on university
intellectual property policies notes that an underlying sentiment of
tension is woven through such provisions as the university
attempts to balance the educational interests of students with the
financial interests of the school.100 Nevertheless, universities often
take an extensive approach to defining the materials and subject
matter to which their intellectual property policies may extend.101
Critical analysis of these policies is especially pertinent in
situations involving undergraduate students and copyrightable
works because these situations usually receive less attention than
address such issues as ownership. Diana Rubio’s case provides a prime example
of how an existing intellectual property policy may be just as ineffective as no
policy at all. This is because the policy—which specifically named the student
as the owner of his or her work—nevertheless allowed the university to claim
ownership of Rubio’s drawing and excluded her from the distribution of
royalties. See Copyright Policy at Section 5(a), FASHION INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, http://www.fitnyc.edu/12428.asp (last updated Nov. 17, 2011)
(“Subject to the other relevant terms of this Policy, students shall retain
intellectual property ownership of works created in the course of their academic
activities at FIT, including class work, research materials, works of art or design,
music and theses.”).
99
Anthony J. Luppino, Fixing A Hole: Eliminating Ownership
Uncertainties to Facilitate University-Generated Innovation, 78 UMKC L. REV.
367, 371 (2010). See also, e.g., Copyright Policy, FASHION INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, http://www.fitnyc.edu/12428.asp (last updated Nov. 17, 2011);
Intellectual Property Rights, THE NEW SCHOOL, http://www.newschool.edu/
leadership/provost/policies/property-rights/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015);
University Policies, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY (July 1, 2012),
http://www.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu/compliance/documents/IPPolicyFINAL.p
df .
100
Luppino, supra note 99, at 373 (comparing the “self-conscious tension”
to the discomfort that doctors and lawyers feel while marrying their business
interests with the interests of the individuals they are set out to help).
101
Id. at 374.
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the traditional intellectual property disputes that universities face.
The more frequent disputes occur at the graduate level because it
traditionally incorporates sponsored research. Sponsored research
raises ownership issues directly between the graduate students who
create the work and the universities that fund the work because
these relationships between the student and school more closely
mirror the employer/employee relationship that would trigger the
work-for-hire doctrine.102
Many universities’ intellectual property policies state, as a
general rule, that undergraduate students will own any intellectual
product that they “make, discover, or create in the course of their
research.”103 However, these same policies often carve out a
number of exceptions that would warrant university ownership of
student work, including when the work was sponsored or funded,
and when the student acted as an employee, as in the Fleurimond
case.104 It is not enough to rely on the basic language of such
policies, however. That FIT misappropriated Diana Rubio’s rights

102

See id. at 375.
See, e.g., WIPO Guidelines, supra note 95, at 13.
104
WIPO’s Guidelines suggest exceptions in situations where (1) students
receive compensation from the school in the form of wages, salary, or stipend;
(2) the student makes significant use of the university’s resources; (3) the
research was funded by a sponsor under a grant or sponsored research
agreement; (4) the work involves theses or dissertations. Id at 13. Several
schools follow this policy. See, e.g., FASHION INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 99, at 10 (stating that FIT will retain ownership of works created making
substantial use of college resources, created as a research project sponsored by a
governmental, corporate or other sponsor, created at the direction of or
commissioned by FIT, closely associated with a patent owned by FIT, or created
within the scope of an employment relationship with FIT). Parson’s New School
includes similar exceptions. See THE NEW SCHOOL, supra note 99, at 1–2
(describing three exceptions to the general rule: (1) outside sponsored
research/activities, (2) university commissioned or sponsored activities (3)
student or faculty initiated agreements). New York University also includes
similar exceptions. See NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, supra note 99 (describing how
the general rule will not apply where a work is created in the course of (a)
sponsored research (b) any research or other activity involving Substantial Use
of University Resources (c) participation as a team member on a University
project involving other members of the University Community (d) employment
or other compensated duties).
103
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despite an FIT policy that did not provide for such action,105
demonstrates the potential for the inconsistent and inappropriate
application of university intellectual policies. Furthermore, the
schools lack legal authorization to enforce these policies as binding
contracts.106 University policies do not carry with them the binding
“force of law” and “cannot, in themselves, be used as valid legal
claims on students’ intellectual products.”107
A.

University Intellectual Property Policies Lack
Adequate Consideration

The unenforceability of university intellectual property policies
turns first on their lack of consideration. One of the most
fundamental aspects of contract law is that there must be sufficient
consideration in order for a contract to be enforceable.108 The
Restatement of Contracts defines consideration as one of four
things: (1) an act; (2) a forbearance; (3) the creation or
modification of a legal relation; or (4) a return promise.109 In
essence, consideration is a bargained-for exchange.110 Schools fail
to meet this requirement in the transfer of rights from a student to
the university because the school does not offer the student
consideration.
The first exchange between the student and the university
occurs at the very beginning stages when the student pays tuition
to attend the school. There is valid consideration between the
parties in this situation, where one act is exchanged for another: the
student pays the school in exchange for an education accomplished
through the university’s acts of instruction and guidance. If the
school wants to claim ownership of a student’s intellectual
105

See FASHION INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 99, at 10. See also
supra note 98 for a discussion of the problem of this policy.
106
Patel, supra note 13, at 505.
107
HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 32.
108
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.4 (Matthew Bender &
Co. Inc., eds., 2014) (“An informal promise without consideration that stands
utterly alone creates no legal duty and is not enforceable. To be enforceable,
there must be a bargained-for exchange . . . .”).
109
R ESTATEMENT (F IRST ) OF C ONTRACTS § 75 (1932).
110
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 108 § 5.4.
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property rights to work the student creates through that instruction,
it must offer the student additional consideration.111 The school
would be correct in arguing that there is valid consideration where
the contractual agreement is between the university and a graduate
student or faculty member.112 In those situations, the faculty
member or graduate student bargains for compensation as an
employee in exchange for awarding the school ownership rights
over his protectable work product.113 Because undergraduate
students are not paid such compensation, this argument would fail
in the undergraduate context.
This argument is based on a well-founded rule of contract law
called the pre-existing duty rule. Professor Arthur Corbin, a
leading scholar of contract law and author of the legal treatise
Corbin on Contracts, states the well-founded rule quite simply:
“Neither the performance of duty nor the promise to render a
performance already required by duty is a sufficient consideration
for a return promise.”114 A duty arises under a number of general
theories of obligation under contract law, including the legal
doctrines of reliance, unjust enrichment, and tort.115 The university
already bargained, through the initial tuition-education exchange,
for the obligation to provide the student with an education before
the student created any copyrightable work. Thus, tuition payments
cannot serve as adequate consideration for the student’s
copyrightable work after the initial exchange because the school
had a pre-existing duty to provide that education after it accepted

111

Patel, supra note 13, at 505 (“Allocating the ownership rights in a
student-generated invention absent additional consideration does not appear
justifiable.”). The school would be correct in arguing that there is valid
consideration where the contractual agreement is between the university and a
graduate student or faculty member. Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 38.
In those situations, the faculty member or graduate student bargains for
compensation as an employee in exchange for awarding the school ownership
rights over protectable work product. Id. Since no such compensation is paid to
undergraduate students, this argument would fail in the undergraduate context.
112
Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 38.
113
Id.
114
R OBERT S. S UMMERS & R OBERT H. H ILLMAN , CONTRACT AND
RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 87 (6th ed. 2011).
115
Id. at 36.
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payment.116 To comply with contract law, the university must
therefore provide the student with additional consideration if it
chooses to rely on its intellectual property policies as contractual
obligations. Without such additional consideration, these policies
are unenforceable as contracts under the pre-existing duty doctrine.
Absent an enforceable contract whereby the student agrees to
transfer his rights, the student will not owe the university an
obligation to do so.
An article published by the Kansas Journal of Law and Policy
explains the two ways in which a university may offer the student
such additional consideration in order to satisfy the consideration
requirement.117 The first method is to offer the student monetary
compensation,118 and the second is to require students to assign
their rights to the school before allowing them to participate in any
work that may result in the creation of copyrightable work.119
Authors Nordheden and Hoeflich explain that the school may be
opposed to offering payment for basic financial reasons or due to a
separate university policy that prevents a student from receiving
both academic credit and monetary compensation for simultaneous
work.120 The second option would also prove futile because the act
of conditioning a student’s participation in the learning process on
his willingness to forego intellectual property rights would
discourage his learning.121 According to the article, this option

116

Id. at 87.
See generally Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 34.
118
It is important to note that the compensation offered must be fair in light
of the circumstances of the particular situation. The Second Restatement of
Contracts provides that “a false recital of consideration” or consideration that is
“merely nominal” will not suffice. R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF C ONTRACTS §
71 cmt.b (1979).
119
Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 38. In this situation, the school
would offer the student permission to participate in the educational setting that
would induce production of protectable works in exchange for the student’s
agreement to transfer ownership rights to the school. Permission is granted in
exchange for agreement and consideration is satisfied.
120
Id. at 38–39.
121
See, e.g., id. at 38–39; Patel, supra note 13, at 504 (“If . . . the student
and her determination to maximize her creative potential become inhibited,
society would miss out on the prompt disclosure of the student’s idea.”).
117
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would be “antithetical to the educational mission of the university
and highly exploitative of undergraduate labor.”122
Aside from monetary compensation or preconditioned
agreements, a university may argue that course credit may serve as
adequate compensation for purposes of satisfying the requirements
of contract law and enforcing its intellectual property policies. The
major flaw of this argument is that it falls directly within the
realms of the aforementioned pre-existing duty doctrine. The
analysis of this issue turns to the context of unpaid internships
discussed in Part III.B of this Note. In the Notre Dame article,
Gregory discusses the ineffectiveness of a university’s use of
academic credit as currency.123 Gregory explains that academic
credit cannot constitute compensation in the unpaid internship
setting since students are the ones paying the school for that
academic credit.124 Once again, the university would be attempting
to “double-dip” into the pot of student-generated funds in order to
enforce its intellectual property policies without additional
consideration. The pre-existing duty doctrine bars this action and
thus prevents academic credit from serving as sufficient
compensation under contract law.125

122

Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 39. Nordheden and Hoeflich
also explain that regardless of such a policy argument, the law on adhesion
contracts (those that favor one party over the other on a “take it or leave it”
basis) would likely deem this agreement unenforceable. Id. See infra Part.III, for
a thorough analysis as to how this option would lay contradictory to the
underlying purposes of Copyright law.
123
Gregory, supra note 82, at 227.
124
Id. at 260 (“[T]he school gets paid, not to teach, but simply to put
credits on transcripts.”). Gregory argues that, in essence, all the school is doing
in exchange for the thousands of dollars students pay per credit is providing a
letter on paper, since the employer is actually the entity providing the instruction
and occupational education to the student. Id.
125
The pre-existing duty rule is one “corollary” of the doctrine of
consideration that judges apply to contract issues with a “frequency unmatched”
by any other (others include illusory promises and mutual obligation). Mark B.
Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of
Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713, 713, 730 (1996). Stated simply, the
rule provides that “[p]romising to perform, or performing, an act that one is
already under a legal duty to perform, is not consideration for a return promise.”
Id. at 730.
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Even where the pre-existing duty doctrine does not apply,126
the argument that academic credit may serve as a form of payment
to students remains flawed. Federal regulators deem school credit
an illegitimate tool in satisfying compensation requirements,
“especially when the internship . . . mainly benefits the
employer.”127 Since academic credit is an insufficient replacement
for monetary compensation where students participate in unpaid
internships that serve the needs of the employer, it logically
follows that regulators would similarly deem credit inadequate
where students complete coursework for the financial benefit of
only the school.
Regardless of which argument a university may raise in
defense of its existing intellectual property policies, the policies
will continue to lack the requisite additional consideration to claim
ownership of student intellectual property rights as long as the
university fails to provide the student with monetary
compensation.
B.

University Intellectual
Unconscionable

Property

Policies

are

An intellectual property policy that fails to offer students
compensation before transferring rights to the school is also
unenforceable under contract law’s policing doctrine of
unconscionability. Courts use the principle of unconscionability to
strike down extremely unfair or oppressive contracts.128

126

For purposes of argument and clarity, this Note will proceed under the
false assumption that the pre-existing duty doctrine does not, in fact, apply to the
circumstance.
127
Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03intern.html (“[F]ederal
regulators say that receiving college credit does not necessarily free companies
from paying interns.”). Greenhouse includes as regulators officials in Oregon,
California, and other states who are investigating employers who facilitate
unpaid internships, as well as the U.S. Department of Labor. Id.
128
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining
unconscionability as “[t]he principle that a court may refuse to enforce a
contract that is unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses during
contract formation or because of overreaching contractual terms, esp. terms that
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Traditionally, courts were only able to invalidate inequitable
contracts by employing other policies of contract law, such as
insufficient consideration or duress.129 However, when the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) codified the unconscionability
doctrine in 1952, modern courts gained access to a statutory
foundation upon which to rely when dealing with unfair
agreements.130 Although the UCC applies exclusively to sale of
goods contracts, Section 208 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts adopted the concept of unconscionability in 1981 and
has since carried the doctrine across the boundaries of sale of
goods cases and into general contract law.131
Issues of unconscionability arise where an agreement involves
“an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party.”132 Courts generally recognize two forms of
unconscionability and require that both be present before striking
down a contract as unenforceable.133 Procedural unconscionability
relates to the problems that occur during the contract-making
process and produce coercive or “unfairly surprising”
agreements.134 Substantive unconscionability, on the other hand,
pertains to defects in the resulting agreements.135
are unreasonably favorable to one party while precluding meaningful choice for
the other party.”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1979).
129
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.2 (2011).
130
See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1952).
131
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
132
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
133
See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967). But see, Melissa T.
Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism – The Sliding Scale
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describes a trend among state supreme courts to replace the hard and fast rule,
which requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability with a sliding
scale approach, which allows for courts to strike down a contract for
unconscionability where expansive evidence of one category compensates for
limited evidence of the other. Id. Five courts have taken the sliding scale one
step further in finding unconscionability where only one category is present. Id.
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1. Procedural Unconscionability—Students
Unfairly Surprised and Lack Choice

are

Procedural unconscionability occurs where either the terms of
an agreement unfairly surprise a party or where a party lacks
meaningful choice in its decision to enter into the agreement.136
The policy behind procedural unconscionability proceeds on the
ground that a party must fully understand the terms he is agreeing
to, in terms of both comprehension and acknowledgement,137 and
must also be in a position to negotiate those terms in his own best
interest. The student-university context provides a fine example of
procedural unconscionability: students fail to understand the terms
of the agreements they enter into because (1) they are unaware of
the existence of intellectual property policies in the first place; (2)
they lack the capacity to fully understand the terms of the policies
when they are aware; and (3) they lack the standing and bargaining
position to negotiate those terms in their own best interests.
The first element of procedural unconscionability, unfair
surprise, is present either where a contracting party lacks
sophistication or where a contract’s terms are inconspicuous.138
Though students do not represent the class of individuals that
courts generally recognize as unsophisticated,139 intellectual
property policies nevertheless unfairly surprise undergraduate
students because the terms are inconspicuous. Schools generally do
not call the students’ attention toward their intellectual property
policies140 but instead bury them deep within the university’s

136

Kendall K. Johnson, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of
Publicity, Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete, 19 SPORTS L. J. 1, 16
(2012).
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Id. One must both realize that he is agreeing to adhere to some term and
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Id. at 16–17.
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See, e.g., Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Del. 1992) (holding
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year-old plaintiff with a ninth grade education in determining whether the
contract at hand was procedurally unconscionable).
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See Patel, supra note 13, at 503–04.
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general set of policies.141 While deciding whether to accept
enrollment into a university, students are often most focused on the
school’s degree programs, course offerings, and various elements
of campus life.142 Close to the bottom of that list, if at all, would be
the school’s policy on intellectual property rights.143 Often,
students do not seek out these policies until long after enrollment
and only after the student has already created protectable work,144
as was the case with Diana Rubio. Under the current state of the
law, it is too late for the student to raise concerns or object to the
policy’s terms at that point since she already (inadvertently) signed
away her rights by enrolling in the school.
University intellectual property policies are procedurally
unconscionable not simply because the students fail to read them,
but rather because the students do not recognize them as binding
contracts. While courts generally hold that parties are bound by a
contract whether they have read it or not, they recognize an
exception where the writing does not appear to be a contract and
141

For example, while trying to locate the intellectual property policy of
New York University, I had to first visit the school’s general website and then
click onto its designated policy page. From there, I had to search among several
categorical tabs such as “Financial Affairs”, “Governance & Legal”,
“Information Technology”, “Operations & Safety”, “Research”, and “Student
Affairs” and the dozens of policies listed under each tab, and I had to search
through each tab, using only my own logical reasoning as a guide, to understand
each before finally coming across the school’s “Statement of Policy on
Intellectual Property.” It is difficult to imagine how likely a prospective NYU
student would be to conduct such a search and locate the document successfully
where it took an individual who was specifically seeking out such information
more time and effort than a simple point and click. University Policies and
Guidelines, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, http://www.nyu.edu/about/policiesguidelines-compliance/policies-and-guidelines/academic-affairs-facultypolicies.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
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See Patel, supra note 13, at 503 (“Students choosing universities . . .
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substance of the . . . program.”).
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See id. at 503–04; Perez-Kudzma, supra note 11, at 499 (“Even though
intellectual property policies are prominent in academia, some universities fail
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activities at universities without knowing the extent of their intellectual property
rights.”).
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the party that created it does not call the agreeing party’s special
attention to the contract terms.145 The present situation provides an
appropriate context for invoking this exception since students are
not likely to understand that a school policy is an enforceable legal
contract, or that choosing to enroll in the school serves as assent to
all of the provisions of such policies. The policies do not have
signature lines, are not presented as formal documents with
counsel present, and do not expressly call themselves “contracts”
or even “agreements.”146 It is unlikely that a student, likely fresh
out of high school, would recognize a school policy as an
enforceable contract to which he is legally bound. Further, as
explained above, universities generally do not make the effort to
call their intellectual property policies to their students’ special
attention so that students may acknowledge them.147 Such lack of
notice and understanding demonstrates how unfairly surprising,
and thus procedurally unconscionable, these intellectual property
policies are to students.
The second element that demonstrates procedural
unconscionability is lack of meaningful choice. In the event that a
university does call special attention to its intellectual property
policy, a policy that would allow for the transfer of students’ rights
to the school absent adequate consideration would nonetheless be
invalid since undergraduate students lack meaningful choice while
agreeing to the school’s intellectual property policy. A party lacks
meaningful choice where “an inequality of bargaining power
results in ‘no real negotiation’ and the weaker party is virtually
coerced into accepting the other party’s terms.”148 Courts will hold
145

See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’n Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29–30 (2d
Cir. 2002) (holding that “a consumer’s clicking on a ‘download’ button does not
communicate assent to contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the
consumer that clicking on the button would signify assent to the terms”). The
Specht court held that under California common law, a contract is unenforceable
where the agreement does not appear to be a contract and the terms are not
called to the recipient’s attention. Id.
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See supra notes 98 and 104 (discussing the policies of certain
universities). The polices discussed in those footnotes provide lucid examples
of the deficiencies of existing university policies.
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Perez-Kudzma, supra note 11, at 499.
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Johnson, supra note 136, at 17 (quoting Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60
Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Ct. App. 1997)).
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a contract unenforceable where the weaker position of one party
impedes his ability to negotiate and effectively coerces him into
agreeing to a contract.149 Universities do not participate in
negotiations with individual students regarding their policies but
rather offer the policies on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.150 Under
contract law, such agreements are known as contracts of
“adhesion.”151 Adhesion contracts lend themselves to
unconscionability by definition, since they usually involve the
reluctant agreement of one party despite his dissatisfaction with the
terms.152
Adhesion contracts are particularly troublesome where they
position inexperienced and eager students against established
institutions. A student who seeks to attend a school like Harvard
due to its prestige, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for
its excellence in applied sciences and mathematics, or FIT to learn
from fashion industry professionals, will almost always choose the
“take it” option, despite unfavorable terms.153 It is difficult to
imagine how egregious policy terms would have to be in order to
provoke a student like Diana Rubio, who dreams of a career in
fashion design, to turn down an admissions offer from FIT, the
“premier institution for fashion and related professions.”154
Not only do students lack meaningful choice based on their
inability to negotiate, they also lack the ability to assent due to
their inferior bargaining power. A young, inexperienced student
has little power to negotiate with an educational institution like a
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university.155 While the student represents but one applicant among
a sea of thousands from which the university may choose in
making offers of admission,156 the student usually has a smaller
pool of schools from which to choose, based first on admissions
offers and then on the student’s primary concerns such as his
educational and financial needs.157 The difference in size between
the pool of college applicants and the pool of schools offering
admission helps demonstrate the magnitude of the difference in
bargaining power that weighs heavily in favor of the university.
The university’s undoubtedly superior sophistication and level
of familiarity with the terms and consequences of its policies
further contribute to its heightened bargaining power.158
Undergraduate students are not in the business of maintaining
educational institutions, nor are they likely to be familiar with
intellectual property law. Students lack familiarity with a
university’s policies,159 as well as the foresight and financial means
to seek legal counsel before agreeing to them.160 The obvious
disparity in size between the institution and the student also
demonstrates the inequality in bargaining power. Universities
typically do not take certain actions that would mitigate the effects
of the size difference,161 such as taking the initiative to explain to
the student the key provisions or drawing attention toward them
with conspicuous type.162 Differences in size therefore play a much
155
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larger role in the unconscionability analysis. When coupled with
the other issues of unfair surprise and lack of meaningful choice,
the case for procedural unconscionability falls in favor of the
student.
2. Substantive Unconscionability—The Policies
are One-sided and Unfair
Substantive unconscionability turns on the fairness of the final
contract. The analysis is not based on the parties involved or the
context under which the terms were agreed upon. Instead, it
focuses on determining whether the single agreement at issue163
contains terms that are one-sided and extremely unfair.164 A court
will strike down a contract as substantively unconscionable where
the agreement is both unreasonable and so “‘harsh’ or ‘oppressive’
in nature, or the terms so one-sided as to ‘shock the
conscience.’”165 FIT’s intellectual property policy presents an
example of an agreement that is so one-sided that it “shocks the
conscience.” On one side of the agreement is FIT, a state-funded
institution that educates 10,000 students per academic year.166
With the support of its intellectual property policy, FIT may claim
ownership of undergraduate students’ intellectual property rights—
as in the case of Diana Rubio—which then allows the school to
collect royalties from sales of the Everything Backpack.167 Diana
Rubio, the aspiring young designer,168 sits on the opposite side of
the contract from FIT, where she is excluded from sharing in the
profits from for her work.169 A policy like FIT’s, which allows a
university to reap the fruits of its student’s labor while excluding
that student from the financial benefit “shocks the conscience” and
provides cause for a finding of substantive unconscionability.
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Where a university relies on its intellectual property policies as
binding contracts to usurp ownership rights of student-generated
work, it violates basic principles of contract law that call for
equality and fairness. The agreements are procedurally
unconscionable because students lack notice, understanding, and
bargaining power; and substantively unconscionable because their
terms are shockingly one-sided and unfair to students. As such,
even if courts deem these policies enforceable despite a lack of
consideration, they would likely strike them down under the
doctrine of unconscionability.
C.

The Enforcement of These Intellectual Property
Policies Runs Against Public Policy

Intellectual property policies that allow universities to claim
ownership of students’ protectable works not only violate contract
law, but also run fiercely against long-standing principles of public
policy. Courts generally define public policy as “the present
concept of public welfare or general good . . . .”170 Public policy
serves as a policing doctrine through which courts protect public
interests from agreements that may be offensive or in conflict with
such interests.171 Agreements that run against policy will likely see
the same fate as those that are unconscionable—courts will strike
them down as unenforceable.172
Like the unconscionability doctrine, the concept of public
policy involves both procedural and substantive components.173
However, the first step in the public policy analysis is not to decide
whether the agreement in question is procedurally or substantively
170

Grace McLane Giesel, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 14 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., Vol. 15 2003) (citing Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 214
Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d at 5).
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Id. at 2.
172
Id. at 1.
173
Id. at 6–7. A contract that is procedurally contrary to public policy is
one that conflicts solely due to the fact that the contract is consummated on a
day of the week where a law prohibits contracting on that specific day. Id. A
contract that is substantively contrary to public policy is one that involves a
performance that in itself would conflict with public policy, such as contracting
for illegal activity. Id.
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in conflict with public policy.174 Instead, it is to first determine
whether a public policy exists regarding the format or substance of
the agreement in the first place.175 Constitutions, statutes, and
common law all contribute to what constitutes “public policy,”
though courts have failed to provide a clear definition of the
concept.176 Suffice it to say that public policy is a term that
envelops the interests, values, and morals of the general public that
are of such importance as to warrant legislative and judicial
protection.177
The very language and purpose of the Intellectual Property
Clause in the U.S. Constitution serves as strong evidence that the
promotion of learning and creation stands at the forefront of public
policy. As explained in Part I of this Note, the Clause was meant to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts in order to
expand knowledge for the ultimate benefit of the public.178
Intellectual property policies that allocate student ownership rights
to the school have the opposite effect, however.179 These policies
hinder creativity because students are less likely to create
protectable work when they are faced with the threat of losing their
rights.180 Carmenelisa Perez-Kudzma, a professor of law who has
focused on intellectual property law, writes, “[s]tudents will not
feel confident in exploring their intellectual potential if they fear
losing their intellectual property to those they trust.”181 Through
the use of such policies, the university “fails in its mission to
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encourage the generation and dissemination of knowledge for the
benefit of the university community and society as a whole.”182
The continued enforcement of intellectual property policies
that allow for this transfer of student rights would have further
consequences that harm society. Where a university expressly
gives students notice of its policy to seize ownership rights to
protectable work, a student will likely proceed in either of two
ways. The first would be the outright decision to seek an education
elsewhere. This resolution is detrimental to the student because it
impedes his ability to choose a school based on more important
factors such as degree programs and campus life.183 Furthermore, it
is unlikely that the student would even be able to locate a school
that has a more protective policy, and the student will have wasted
time, money, and effort in the unsuccessful search.184 The second
potential consequence of enforcing these intellectual property
policies is that the student will simply choose to abstain from any
coursework that has the potential to yield protectable works.185
This turns back to the issue of hindering creation as described
above, which negatively affects both society, by prohibiting the
student’s idea from ever entering the public purview, and the
student, by stunting his learning, and forcing him to decide
between relinquishing his rights or harming his course grade by
refusing to complete the work.186
Intellectual property policies that facilitate the transfer of
ownership rights from the undergraduate student to the school
absent compensation have both immediate and lasting effects that
disturb public policy. These policies run against the constitutional
foundations of intellectual property law by diminishing a student’s
incentive to create and preventing the expansion of knowledge.
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The benefits of student ownership of intellectual property
rights far outweigh any concerns. One issue turns on whether or
not the students are qualified to take on the responsibility that
comes with the ownership of these rights.187 That existing law does
not enforce an age requirement for authors of protectable works
weakens this contention dramatically. If the writers of the
Constitution did not find it worrisome that intellectual property
rights may develop with young authors, and since Congress has yet
to amend the law to prohibit such authors from receiving
protection, it is hard to find reason for such worry in the present
context.
Another argument against student retention of copyright
ownership is that it would place a target on the backs of student
creators and make them vulnerable to manipulation by intellectual
property firms.188 This argument ignores the fact that these
students are just as defenseless against professional brokers as they
are against the universities they attend. Diana Rubio was exploited
not by an overzealous copyright scout who sold her a wild dream,
but rather by the university she trusted. Instead of attempting to
protect students from mistreatment by outside parties, universities
should first examine their own intellectual property policies to
make sure they do not promote such exploitation.
V. SOLUTION: A CALL FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
STUDENTS’ RIGHTS

TO

PROTECT

Congress should legislate to protect the intellectual property
rights of undergraduate students from misappropriation by their
universities. Despite ample support from the Constitution, contract
law, and public policy, the system of copyright law as it exists
187
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Id. at 510 (“Universities may take a paternalistic view that students will
render themselves vulnerable to unscrupulous brokers who will take advantage
of the students.”). This suggests that intellectual property brokers might attempt
to capitalize on the youth and naïvety of undergraduate students by making
unfavorable offers for the transfer of their rights.
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today fails to adequately protect undergraduate students.
Arguments against invoking such protection are without merit and
fail to overcome the abundant and compelling reasons that support
student ownership. Though Diana Rubio’s case presents but one
example of this problem, the risk of similar issues occurring is far
from trivial.189
Undergraduate students will continue to create copyrightable
works for as long as the Copyright Act awards their works
protection since creation of protectable works occurs regularly
throughout the education process.190 And as long as courts
continue to enforce policies like that of FIT, the potential for
misappropriation of student rights will continue to burden the
educational system. University policies, without good reason, fail
to provide an equitable approach to the distribution of intellectual
property rights.191 As such, Congress should be proactive in
initiating uniform and fair standards by which all students and
universities must adhere.
An amendment to the Copyright Act that would expressly
prevent a university from claiming ownership of intellectual
property rights to protectable student-generated work would
successfully achieve that goal. A relatively minor amendment to
Section 201 of the Copyright Act would provide the necessary
protection to undergraduate students. As referenced earlier in this
Note, Section 201 describes the different forms of copyright
ownership, such as initial ownership and works made for hire.192 It
explains that copyright ownership may be transferred and describes
how the law will “not give effect” to any transfer that is
“involuntary.”193 Section 201(e) provides:
When an individual author’s ownership of a
copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
189
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copyright, has not previously been transferred
voluntarily by that individual author, no action by
any governmental body or other official or
organization purporting to seize, expropriate,
transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with
respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under
this title, except as provided under title 11.194
Congress should amend the language of Section 201(e) to
expressly include universities so as to prevent the involuntary
transfer of rights from the students to their respective schools. An
effective amendment might read as follows:
When an individual author’s ownership of a
copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, has not previously been transferred
voluntarily by that individual author, no action by
any governmental body or other official or
organization, including a university, purporting to
seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of
ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of
the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be
given effect under this title, except as provided
under title 11.195
Proper exceptions will, of course, apply in situations where the
work-for-hire doctrine is appropriate, as in the Fleurimond case, or
where the university offers the student adequate compensation.
The amount of payment should be fair in light of the
circumstances; as one author puts it: “Nominal payments will not
do.”196
The unambiguous inclusion of universities in the “Involuntary
Transfer” provision of the Copyright Act would eliminate the
potential for universities to create loophole justifications for the
transfer based on unenforceable contracts or a faulty application of
the work-for-hire doctrine. Unlike the terms of university
194
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intellectual property policies, which may be inconspicuous to
students,197 the suggested amendment to the Copyright Act is a
clear and obvious recognition of the fact that a university may not
seize intellectual property ownership rights. In the event that a
situation like that of Diana Rubio were to occur under such
legislation, the student would be able to rely not only on the strong
arguments regarding copyright and contract law discussed earlier
in this Note, but would also be able to point directly to the
Constitution in order to support her position and protect her rights.
That FIT is able to claim ownership of Diana Rubio’s ownership
rights demonstrates the need for more clear-cut protection of
undergraduate students’ rights. Where the Constitution expressly
includes a university amongst those institutions that may not seize
“an individual’s ownership of a copyright”, a university like FIT
would have little, if any, defense for such action.
The amendment above would provide students with a
comforting blanket of protection that would encourage their
creativity and foster learning in an environment where such
activities are of paramount importance. It would create a safety net
upon which undergraduate students may rely in addition to the
more basic principles of copyright and contract law, which provide
further, though less express, protections. Such legislation would
help realize the true missions of intellectual property law by
protecting authors and incentivizing creation.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution addresses some of the most fundamental
concepts upon which this nation was established. The intellectual
property clause expresses one of these concepts through its
dedication to the promotion of knowledge and creation. A concept
that is so deeply rooted in American history deserves the utmost
respect and attention, especially as it pertains to society’s growing
class of academics. Undergraduate students represent one of the
197
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few classes that may challenge the university for ownership rights:
where the work-for-hire doctrine precludes both graduate students
who participate in sponsored research and professors who qualify
as employees from contesting the transfer of rights, undergraduate
students may rely on contract law to bolster their claims.198 Despite
this support, undergraduate students’ rights are among the least
protected in the university context.199
The need for protection is even more significant in light of the
fact that universities lack legal and equitable standing to claim
ownership of student protectable works. The work-for-hire
doctrine of the Copyright Act is inapplicable in circumstances
where students act solely in their capacity as students. The
intellectual property policies that might facilitate the transfer of
ownership to such works are unenforceable contracts because they
do not satisfy contract law’s fundamental requirement of
consideration and violate its policing doctrines of
unconscionability and public policy.
Legislators should change existing law, which enables the
exploitation of students like Diana Rubio. By passing a legislative
act that expressly prevents the transfer of intellectual property
rights from the student to the university absent appropriate
compensation, Congress would both provide students with muchdeserved protection and uphold the constitutional goal of
promoting the expansion of knowledge.
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